| 000 | 05305nam a2200709 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 8839753 | ||
| 003 | IEEE | ||
| 005 | 20200413152933.0 | ||
| 006 | m eo d | ||
| 007 | cr cn |||m|||a | ||
| 008 | 190927s2019 caua fob 001 0 eng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9781681736358 _qelectronic |
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| 020 |
_z9781681736365 _qhardcover |
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| 020 |
_z9781681736341 _qpaperback |
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| 024 | 7 |
_a10.2200/S00940ED1V01Y201907GCI004 _2doi |
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| 035 | _a(CaBNVSL)thg00979528 | ||
| 035 | _a(OCoLC)1121141075 | ||
| 040 |
_aCaBNVSL _beng _erda _cCaBNVSL _dCaBNVSL |
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| 050 | 4 |
_aHB144 _b.G746 2019eb |
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| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a300.1/5193 _223 |
| 100 | 1 |
_aGreenwood, Garrison W., _eauthor. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aOn the study of human cooperation via computer simulation : _bwhy existing computer models fail to tell us much of anything / Garrison W. Greenwood . |
| 264 | 1 |
_a[San Rafael, California] : _bMorgan & Claypool, _c[2019] |
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| 300 |
_a1 PDF (xiii, 80 pages) : _billustrations (chiefly color). |
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| 336 |
_atext _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_aelectronic _2isbdmedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _2rdacarrier |
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| 490 | 1 |
_aSynthesis lectures on games and computational intelligence, _x2573-6493 ; _v#4 |
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| 538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
| 538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. | ||
| 500 | _aPart of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science. | ||
| 504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 71-76) and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | _a1. Social dilemmas -- 2. Prisoner's dilemma and other social dilemma games -- 2.1. Game theory -- 2.2. The prisoner's dilemma game -- 2.3. The public goods game -- 2.4. The snowdrift game | |
| 505 | 8 | _a3. Spatial and network games -- 3.1. Spatial games -- 3.2. Network games -- 3.3. Problems with spatial and network games -- 3.4. Summary | |
| 505 | 8 | _a4. The case against weak selection -- 4.1. Summary | |
| 505 | 8 | _a5. The Moran process and replicator dynamics -- 5.1. Depicting strategy evolution -- 5.2. The frequency-dependent Moran process -- 5.3. Replicator equations -- 5.4. Comparing evolutionary mechanisms -- 5.5. Summary | |
| 505 | 8 | _a6. The problems with computer models -- 6.1. Model realism -- 6.2. Model validation -- 6.3. Asking the right questions -- 6.4. Summary | |
| 505 | 8 | _a7. The path forward -- 7.1. The Moran process -- 7.2. Spatial games -- 7.3. Population sizes -- 7.4. Model validation -- 7.5. Summary. | |
| 506 | _aAbstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers. | ||
| 510 | 0 | _aCompendex | |
| 510 | 0 | _aINSPEC | |
| 510 | 0 | _aGoogle scholar | |
| 510 | 0 | _aGoogle book search | |
| 520 | _aCooperation is pervasive throughout nature, but its origin remains an open question. For decades, social scientists, business leaders, and economists have struggled with an important question: why is cooperation so ubiquitous among unrelated humans? The answers would have profound effects because anything that promotes cooperation leads to more productive work environments and benefits society at large. Game theory provides an ideal framework for studying social dilemmas, or those situations in which people decide whether to cooperate with others (benefitting the group) or defect by prioritizing their self-interest (benefitting only the individual). The social dilemma is formulated as a mathematical game and then programmed into a computer model. Simulating the game allows researchers to investigate potential theories to explain how cooperation emerges and what promotes its persistence. Over the past 25 years, countless papers on social dilemma games have been published, yet arguably little progress has been made. The problem is the social dilemma game models are unrealistic in the sense they contain artificial constructs that deviate from the way humans act. This book describes the shortcomings in current social dilemma game modeling techniques and provides guidance on designing more effective models. A basic introduction to game theory is provided with an emphasis on the prisoner's dilemma, the most widely studied social dilemma game. Individual chapters are provided detailing the shortcomings of weak selection, spatial games, and the Moran process. Computer model validation is also discussed at length. The recommendations found in this book should help design more realistic social dilemma game models likely to produce a better understanding of human cooperation. | ||
| 530 | _aAlso available in print. | ||
| 588 | _aTitle from PDF title page (viewed on September 27, 2019). | ||
| 650 | 0 |
_aCooperation _xComputer simulation. |
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| 650 | 0 |
_aHuman behavior _xComputer simulation. |
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| 650 | 0 | _aGame theory. | |
| 653 | _ahuman cooperation | ||
| 653 | _agame models | ||
| 653 | _asocial dilemmas | ||
| 653 | _aprisoner's dilemma | ||
| 653 | _aspatial games | ||
| 653 | _aMoran process | ||
| 653 | _aeconomic games | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | _iPrint version: |
| 830 | 0 |
_aSynthesis lectures on games and computational intelligence ; _v#4. |
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| 830 | 0 | _aSynthesis digital library of engineering and computer science. | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 |
_3Abstract with links to resource _uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?bknumber=8839753 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_3Abstract with links to full text _uhttps://doi.org/10.2200/S00940ED1V01Y201907GCI004 |
| 999 |
_c562435 _d562435 |
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