000			04429nam a2200685 i 4500
001			6812758
003			IEEE
005			20200413152851.0
006			m eo d
007			cr bn |||m|||a
008			081006s2008 cau fob 001 0 eng d
020			_a9781598292138 (electronic bk.)
020			_a9781598292121 (pbk.)
024	7		_a10.2200/S00126ED1V01Y200808SPT001 _2doi
035			_a(CaBNVSL)gtp00531497
035			_a(OCoLC)269405952
040			_aCaBNVSL _cCaBNVSL _dCaBNVSL
050		4	_aQA76.9.A25 _bJ34 2008
082	0	4	_a005.8 _222
100	1		_aJaeger, Trent.
245	1	0	_aOperating system security _h[electronic resource] / _cTrent Jaeger.
260			_aSan Rafael, Calif. (1537 Fourth Street, 1537 Fourth Street, San Rafael, CA 94901 USA) : _bMorgan & Claypool Publishers, _cc2008.
300			_a1 electronic document (xviii, 218 p.) : _bdigital file.
490	1		_aSynthesis lectures on information security, privacy and trust ; _v#1
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
500			_aPart of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.
500			_aSeries from website.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 179-204) and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Access control fundamentals -- Multics -- Security in ordinary operating systems -- Verifiable security goals -- Security kernels -- Securing commercial operating systems -- Case study: solaris trusted extensions -- Case study: building a secure operating system for linux -- Secure capability systems -- Secure virtual machine systems -- System assurance -- Bibliography -- Biographies -- Index.
506	1		_aAbstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers.
510	0		_aCompendex
510	0		_aINSPEC
510	0		_aGoogle scholar
510	0		_aGoogle book search
520			_aOperating systems provide the fundamental mechanisms for securing computer processing. Since the 1960s, operating systems designers have explored how to build "secure" operating systems -- operating systems whose mechanisms protect the system against a motivated adversary. Recently, the importance of ensuring such security has become a mainstream issue for all operating systems. In this book, we examine past research that outlines the requirements for a secure operating system and research that implements example systems that aim for such requirements. For system designs that aimed to satisfy these requirements, we see that the complexity of software systems often results in implementation challenges that we are still exploring to this day. However, if a system design does not aim for achieving the secure operating system requirements, then its security features fail to protect the system in a myriad of ways.We also study systems that have been retrofit with secure operating system features after an initial deployment. In all cases, the conflict between function on one hand and security on the other leads to difficult choices and the potential for unwise compromises. From this book, we hope that systems designers and implementors will learn the requirements for operating systems that effectively enforce security and will better understand how to manage the balance between function and security.
530			_aAlso available in print.
588			_aTitle from PDF t.p. (Oct. 14, 2008).
650		0	_aOperating systems (Computers)
650		0	_aComputers _xAccess control.
650		0	_aComputer security.
690			_aOperating systems.
690			_aReference monitor.
690			_aMandatory access control.
690			_aSecrecy.
690			_aIntegrity.
690			_aVirtual.
690			_aMachines.
690			_aSecurity kernels.
690			_aCapabilities.
690			_aAccess control lists.
690			_aMultilevel security.
690			_aPolicy lattice.
690			_aAssurance.
710	2		_aMorgan & Claypool Publishers.
730	0		_aSynthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.
830		0	_aSynthesis lectures on information security, privacy and trust ; _v#1.
856	4	2	_3Abstract with links to resource _uhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?bknumber=6812758
856	4	2	_3Abstract with links to full text _uhttp://www.morganclaypool.com/doi/abs/10.2200/S00126ED1V01Y200808SPT001
999			_c561628 _d561628