000			01577 a2200205 4500
005			20190114152249.0
008			190107b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9781107170643
040			_cIIT Kanpur
041			_aeng
082			_a331.2 _bB469f
100			_aBhagat, Sanjai
245			_aFinancial crisis, corporate governance, and bank capital _cSanjai Bhagat
260			_bCambridge University Press _c2017 _aCambridge
300			_axv, 242p
520			_aIn the aftermath of the 2007–8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law.
650			_aBanks and banking -- United States
650			_aCorporate governance -- United States
942			_cBK
999			_c560016 _d560016