000			03318nam a22004935i 4500
001			978-0-387-49896-6
003			DE-He213
005			20161121231123.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100301s2007 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9780387498966 _9978-0-387-49896-6
024	7		_a10.1007/978-0-387-49896-6 _2doi
050		4	_aQA1-939
072		7	_aPB _2bicssc
072		7	_aMAT000000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a510 _223
100	1		_aBrams, Steven J. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aApproval Voting _h[electronic resource] / _cby Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn.
250			_aSecond Edition.
264		1	_aNew York, NY : _bSpringer New York, _c2007.
300			_aXXII, 200 p. 4 illus. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0		_aIntroduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution -- Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest? -- The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate? -- The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules -- Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest? -- Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data -- Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections -- Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions -- Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election -- Epilogue.
520			_aApproval Voting proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and—by offering voters the opportunity to influence election outcomes more equitably—a probable increase in voter turnout. Since the publication of the first edition of this book, its arguments in favor of an election reform practically unknown in 1983 have stood the test of time. Perhaps the proof of the pudding lies in the adoption of approval voting by about a dozen professional societies—several with tens of thousands of members—and their generally favorable experience with it. After a generation of discussion and debate on the subject, the authors remain convinced that Approval Voting is as relevant today as it was when rigorous analysis and systematic empirical research on this election reform began more than 30 years ago.
650		0	_aMathematics.
650		0	_aPolitical science.
650		0	_aEconomic theory.
650		0	_aPublic finance.
650	1	4	_aMathematics.
650	2	4	_aMathematics, general.
650	2	4	_aPublic Economics.
650	2	4	_aPolitical Science.
650	2	4	_aEconomic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
700	1		_aFishburn, Peter C. _eauthor.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9780387498959
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-49896-6
912			_aZDB-2-SMA
950			_aMathematics and Statistics (Springer-11649)
999			_c508899 _d508899