000 03404nam a22004095i 4500
001 978-3-8350-9494-9
003 DE-He213
005 20161121231009.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2007 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783835094949
_9978-3-8350-9494-9
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-8350-9494-9
_2doi
050 4 _aHB73
072 7 _aLBBM
_2bicssc
072 7 _aLNC
_2bicssc
072 7 _aLAW014000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a330
_223
100 1 _aRoosebeke, Bert Van.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aState Liability for Breaches of European Law
_h[electronic resource] :
_bAn economic analysis /
_cby Bert Van Roosebeke.
264 1 _aWiesbaden :
_bDUV,
_c2007.
300 _aXVII, 258 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 _aBasics of the European Union -- A First Look at Breaches. On their Existence, Explanations and the Court’s Answer -- (What and Why) Do Member States breach? -- Treating Breaches: The Law’s and the Court’s Answer -- The Aim of State Liability Regulation. What are we Really Looking for? -- Introducing Normative Law and Economics: Searching for an Aim of State Liability Law -- Are Breaches really that Bad? A Rationale not to allow Breaches -- Introducing Positive Law and Economics. Reaching the Aim -- Evaluation of the Current Situation: Two Distinct Enforcement Mechanisms -- Procedural Aspects. Private and Public Enforcement: Complements or Substitutes? -- Substantive Aspects of Public Enforcement: Deterrence by Fines? -- State Liability in Torts as a Law Enforcement Instrument. Does it work? -- Substantive Aspects of Private Enforcement: Deterrence by Damage Compensation?.
520 _aIn the European Union, member states not respecting European Law run the risk of being held liable in damages to citizens. As an alternative to this Francovich liability and on the initiative of the European Commission, the European Court of Justice may publicly fine states for breaching European Law according to Art. 228 of the European Community Treaty. Using Law & Economics methods, Bert Van Roosebeke analyses non-contractual state liability in the European Union. He empirically explains differences in member states’ breaching behaviour and presents the state liability doctrine as developed by the European Court of Justice in a number of remarkable judgements. On the normative level, he embeds the issue of state liability in the existing Law & Economics literature and concludes that compliance is the true economic aim of state liability legislation. The author presents a comparative analysis of Francovich liability and public fining according to Art. 228 of the EC Treaty. He investigates the effectiveness of both private and public law enforcement mechanisms and – on the basis of a model of political decision-making and the influence of state liability –formulates improvements to the rules of state liability.
650 0 _aLaw and economics.
650 1 4 _aEconomics.
650 2 4 _aLaw and Economics.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783835006539
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9494-9
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
950 _aBusiness and Economics (Springer-11643)
999 _c507040
_d507040