000 03517nam a22005415i 4500
001 978-0-387-24242-2
003 DE-He213
005 20161121230852.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2005 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9780387242422
_9978-0-387-24242-2
024 7 _a10.1007/b104927
_2doi
050 4 _aHD28-70
050 4 _aHD2321-4730.9
072 7 _aKCD
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS082000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a338.6
_223
100 1 _aBen-Yosef, Eldad.
_eauthor.
245 1 4 _aThe Evolution of the US Airline Industry
_h[electronic resource] :
_bTheory, Strategy and Policy /
_cby Eldad Ben-Yosef.
264 1 _aBoston, MA :
_bSpringer US,
_c2005.
300 _aX, 298 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Industrial Organization,
_x0924-4646 ;
_v25
505 0 _aEconomic Deregulation -- Deregulation -- Aircraft -- Destructive Competition -- Noise And Safety Regulation -- Social Regulation -- Noise Regulation -- Safety Regulation -- Overview -- Competition -- Yield Management -- What Next? -- On Theory and Policy Implications.
520 _aFor over three decades the airline industry has continued to maintain a high profile in the public mind and in public policy interest. This high profile is probably not surprising. There does seem to be something inherently newsworthy about airplanes and the people and companies that fly them. The industry was one of the first major industries in the United States to undergo deregulation, in 1978. It thereby transitioned from a closely regulated sector (the former Civil Aeronautics Board tightly controlled everyt thing from prices to routes to entry) to one that is largely market oriented. The incumbent carriers transformed themselves from the point-to-point operators that the CAB had required to the hub-and-spokes structures that took better advantage of their network characteristics. Further, they transformed their pricing from the quite simple structures that the CAB had required to the highly differentiated/segmented pricing structures (“yield management”) that reached an apogee in the late 1990s. Some ca arriers, like American, Delta, and United, were better at this transition; others, like Pan American, TWA, and Eastern, were not. What the incumbent carriers did not do, however, was deal with their costly wage and work rules structures, which were an enduring legacy of their regulatory period. This legacy, when combined with the high-fare end of the yield-management pricing structure, has made them vulnerable to entry by new carriers with lower cost structures.
650 0 _aLaw of the sea.
650 0 _aInternational law.
650 0 _aIndustrial organization.
650 0 _aEconomic policy.
650 0 _aLaw and economics.
650 0 _aEnvironmental economics.
650 1 4 _aEconomics.
650 2 4 _aIndustrial Organization.
650 2 4 _aEconomic Policy.
650 2 4 _aLaw and Economics.
650 2 4 _aLaw of the Sea, Air and Outer Space.
650 2 4 _aEnvironmental Economics.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9780387242132
830 0 _aStudies in Industrial Organization,
_x0924-4646 ;
_v25
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b104927
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
950 _aBusiness and Economics (Springer-11643)
999 _c505171
_d505171