000			03950nam a22005295i 4500
001			978-1-4020-8619-9
003			DE-He213
005			20161121230833.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100301s2008 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402086199 _9978-1-4020-8619-9
024	7		_a10.1007/978-1-4020-8619-9 _2doi
050		4	_aHM401-1281
072		7	_aJHB _2bicssc
072		7	_aSOC026000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a301 _223
245	1	0	_aAnimal Welfare _h[electronic resource] : _bCompeting Conceptions and Their Ethical Implications / _cedited by Richard P. Haynes.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2008.
300			_aXXV, 162 p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0		_aThe Science of Laboratory Animal Care and Welfare -- The Roots for the Emerging Science of Animal Welfare in Great Britain -- The Historical Roots of the Science of Laboratory Animal Welfare in the US -- Laboratory Animal Welfare Issues in the US Legislative and Regulatory History -- Mandated Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees -- Do Regulators of Animal Welfare Need to Develop a Theory of Psychological Well-Being? -- Conclusion -- The Emergence of the Science of Food Animal Welfare Mandated by the Brambell Commission Report -- Rollin’s Theory of Animal Welfare and Its Ethical Implications -- Duncan and the Inclusion of Subjectivity -- Fraser on Animal Welfare, Science, and Ethics -- Appleby-Sandøe and the Human Welfare Model -- Nordenfelt and Nussbaum on Animal Welfare -- Conclusion to Part II -- Giving Animals What We Owe Them -- to Part III -- The Fair Deal Argument -- A General Theory of Our Moral Obligations to Nonhuman Animals -- Conclusion: Competing Conceptions of Animal Welfare.
520			_aMembers of the “animal welfare science community”, which includes both scientists and philosophers, have illegitimately appropriated the concept of animal welfare by claiming to have given a scientific account of it that is more objectively valid than the more “sentimental” account given by animal liberationists. This strategy has been used to argue for merely limited reform in the use of animals. This strategy was initially employed as a way of “sympathetically” responding to the abolitionist claims of anti-vivisectionists, who objected to the use of animals in research. It was subsequently used by farm animal scientists. The primarily reformist (as opposed to abolitionist) goals of this community make the false assumption that there are conditions under which animals may be raised and slaughtered for food or used as models in scientific research that are ethically acceptable. The tendency of the animal welfare science community is to accept this assumption as their framework of inquiry, and thus to discount certain practices as harmful to the interests of the animals that they affect. For example, animal welfare is conceptualized is such a way that death does not count as harmful to the interests of animal, nor prolonged life a benefit.
650		0	_aSocial sciences.
650		0	_aEthics.
650		0	_aPhilosophy of mind.
650		0	_aPhilosophy and science.
650		0	_aPhilosophy.
650		0	_aPolitical philosophy.
650		0	_aSociology.
650	1	4	_aSocial Sciences.
650	2	4	_aSociology, general.
650	2	4	_aEthics.
650	2	4	_aPhilosophy of Science.
650	2	4	_aPhilosophy of Technology.
650	2	4	_aPolitical Philosophy.
650	2	4	_aPhilosophy of Mind.
700	1		_aHaynes, Richard P. _eeditor.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9789048187874
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8619-9
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
950			_aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648)
999			_c504686 _d504686