000			05310nam a22004935i 4500
001			978-1-4020-6279-7
003			DE-He213
005			20161121230828.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100301s2008 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402062797 _9978-1-4020-6279-7
024	7		_a10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7 _2doi
050		4	_aQ1-390
072		7	_aYQS _2bicssc
072		7	_aSCI000000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a500 _223
245	1	0	_aRethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison _h[electronic resource] : _bStabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities? / _cedited by Léna Soler, Howard Sankey, Paul Hoyningen-Huene.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2008.
300			_aX, 395 p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ; _v255
505	0		_aIncommensurability, As Differences in Quasi-Intuitive Cognitive Capacities: A Task for Psychology? -- Incommensurability Naturalized -- Commentary on Bird’s Paper -- Incommensurability in a Wittgensteinian Perspective: How to Make Sense of Nonsense -- Nonsense and Paradigm Change -- Commentary on “Nonsense and Paradigm Change”, by Aristides Baltas -- Intra-Theoretical Change, as a Subjective Creative Elucidation of an Objective Formerly Present Content -- From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change -- Commentary on “From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change”, by Anouk Barberousse -- Investigating the Continuities of Scientific Theorizing: A Task for the Bayesian? -- Modeling High-Temperature Superconductivity: Correspondence at Bay? -- An Instrumental Bayesianism Meets the History of Science -- From the Cumulativity of Physical Predictions to the Cumulativity of Physics -- Is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint -- Commentary on “is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint”, by Bernard d’Espagnat -- From Denotational Continuity to Entity Realism -- The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: the Case of the Electron -- Some Optimism for the Pessimist -- Is a Realist Interpretation of Quantum Physics Possible? -- Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality? -- Commentary on “Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality?”, by Herve Zwirn -- Ontological Continuity: A Policy for Model Building or an Argument in Favour of Scientific Realism? -- Reasons for Choosing Among Readings of Equipollent Theories -- Harré Needs No Realism -- A Change of Perspective: Dissolving the Incommensurability Problem in the Framework of a Theoretical Pluralism Incorporating an Instrumental Rationality -- Of Course Idealizations Are Incommensurable! -- Incommensurability from a Modelling Perspective -- What Can Philosophical Theories of Scientific Method Do? -- The Aim And Structure Of Methodological Theory -- Method and Objectivity -- A New Kind of Incommensurability at the Level of Experimental Practices? -- The Incommensurability of Experimental Practices: An Incommensurability of What? An Incommensurability of A Third Type? -- Some Reflections on Experimental Incommensurability -- Pragmatic Breakdowns: A New Kind of Scientific Revolution? -- Disruptive Scientific Change -- Scientific Revolutions: the View from Inside and the View from Outside.
520			_aThe volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exists between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. And it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of "new experimentalists". The book is constituted of fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. Each paper is followed by a critical commentary. The conference was a striking example of the sort of genuine dialogue that can take place between philosophers of science, historians of science and scientists who come from different traditions and endorse opposing commitments. This is one of the attractions of the volume.
650		0	_aScience.
650		0	_aEpistemology.
650		0	_aPhilosophy and science.
650	1	4	_aScience.
650	2	4	_aScience, general.
650	2	4	_aPhilosophy of Science.
650	2	4	_aEpistemology.
700	1		_aSoler, Léna. _eeditor.
700	1		_aSankey, Howard. _eeditor.
700	1		_aHoyningen-Huene, Paul. _eeditor.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9781402062742
830		0	_aBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ; _v255
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
950			_aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648)
999			_c504598 _d504598