000 03495nam a22004935i 4500
001 978-1-4020-6354-1
003 DE-He213
005 20161121230729.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2007 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781402063541
_9978-1-4020-6354-1
024 7 _a10.1007/978-1-4020-6354-1
_2doi
050 4 _aD1-DX301
072 7 _aPDX
_2bicssc
072 7 _aSCI034000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a509
_223
100 1 _aDilworth, Craig.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aScientific Progress
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories /
_cby Craig Dilworth.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2007.
300 _aXVIII, 306 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthese Library ;
_v153
505 0 _aThe Deductive Model -- The Basis Of The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Science -- The Basis Of The Popperian Conception Of Science -- The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Scientific Progress -- The Popperian Conception Of Scientific Progress -- Popper, Lakatos, And The Transcendence Of The Deductive Model -- Kuhn, Feyerabend, And In Commensurability -- The Gestalt Model -- The Perspectivist Conception Of Science -- Development Of The Perspectivist Conception In The Context Of The Kinetic Theory Of Gases -- The Set-Theoretic Conception Of Science -- Application Of The Perspectivist Conception To The Views Of Newton, Kepler And Galileo.
520 _aKuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution. In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth’s Perspectivist conception of science does both. While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations. "[Dilworth] convincingly works out how from his point of view it is possible to explain the conflict between two theories as an incompatibility of perspectives, and at the same time avoid sliding into relativism by giving criteria for scientific progress." Dialectica.
650 0 _aHistory.
650 0 _aEpistemology.
650 0 _aMetaphysics.
650 0 _aPhilosophy and science.
650 1 4 _aHistory.
650 2 4 _aHistory of Science.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Science.
650 2 4 _aEpistemology.
650 2 4 _aMetaphysics.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781402063534
830 0 _aSynthese Library ;
_v153
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6354-1
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
950 _aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648)
999 _c503137
_d503137