000 04186nam a22005415i 4500
001 978-1-4020-5961-2
003 DE-He213
005 20161121230727.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2007 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781402059612
_9978-1-4020-5961-2
024 7 _a10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2
_2doi
050 4 _aBD143-237
072 7 _aHPK
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI004000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a120
_223
100 1 _aNottelmann, Nikolaj.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aBlameworthy Belief
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Study in Epistemic Deontologism /
_cby Nikolaj Nottelmann.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2007.
300 _aXII, 282 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthese Library ;
_v338
505 0 _aBelief and Acceptance -- Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness -- Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief -- Epistemic Undesirability -- Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness -- Doxastic Control -- Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism -- Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism -- Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism -- Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism -- Intellectual Obligations -- Foresight and Blameworthy Inadvertence to Risk -- Epistemic Blameworthiness Analysed -- Epistemic Autonomy.
520 _aBelieving the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms. This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight. "Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany "Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia.
650 0 _aPhilosophy.
650 0 _aEpistemology.
650 0 _aEthics.
650 0 _aPhilosophy and social sciences.
650 0 _aPolitical science.
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aEpistemology.
650 2 4 _aEthics.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Law.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Mind.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Education.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy, general.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781402059605
830 0 _aSynthese Library ;
_v338
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
950 _aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648)
999 _c503097
_d503097