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001 978-1-4020-5857-8
003 DE-He213
005 20161121230727.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2007 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781402058578
_9978-1-4020-5857-8
024 7 _a10.1007/1-4020-5857-8
_2doi
050 4 _aB53
072 7 _aHPM
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI015000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a128.2
_223
100 1 _aSaka, Paul.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aHow to Think About Meaning
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Paul Saka.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2007.
300 _aXIII, 285 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aPhilosophical Studies Series ;
_v109
505 0 _aTheoretical Issues -- The Case of the Missing Truth-Conditions -- Foundations of Attitudinal Semantics -- Objections and Replies -- Case Studies -- Hate Speech -- Ambiguity -- Quotation and Use-Mention -- Liars and Truth-Tellers.
520 _aAccording to the dominant theory of meaning, truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Classical truth-conditional semantics is coming under increasing attack, however, from contextualists and inferentialists, who agree that meaning is located in the mind. How to Think about Meaning develops an even more radical mentalist semantics, which it does by shifting the object of semantic inquiry. Whereas for classical semantics the object of analysis is an abstract sentence or utterance such as "Grass is green," for attitudinal semantics the object of inquiry is a propositional attitude such as "Speaker so-and-so thinks grass is green." Explicit relativization to some speaker S allows for semantic theory then to make contact with psychology, sociology, historical linguistics, and other empirical disciplines. The attitudinal approach is motivated both by theoretical considerations and by its practical success in dealing with recalcitrant phenomena in the theory of meaning. These include: presuppositions as found in hate speech, and more generally the connotative force of evaluative language; the problem of how to represent ambiguity; quotation and the use-mention distinction; and the liar paradox, which appears to contradict truth-based semantics. "Technically exact, highly readable, and illustrated with valuable examples, ...here is a book to counterbalance decades of misdirected anti-psychologistic semantic dogma." Prof. Dale Jacquette, Pennsylvania State University, U.S.A.
650 0 _aPhilosophy.
650 0 _aMetaphysics.
650 0 _aLanguage and languages
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 _aPragmatism.
650 0 _aSemantics.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Mind.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Language.
650 2 4 _aSemantics.
650 2 4 _aPragmatism.
650 2 4 _aMetaphysics.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy, general.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781402058561
830 0 _aPhilosophical Studies Series ;
_v109
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5857-8
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
950 _aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648)
999 _c503083
_d503083