000 03990nam a22004935i 4500
001 978-1-4020-5085-5
003 DE-He213
005 20161121230724.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2007 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781402050855
_9978-1-4020-5085-5
024 7 _a10.1007/1-4020-5085-2
_2doi
050 4 _aBD300-450
072 7 _aHPJ
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI013000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a111
_223
100 1 _aBoër, Steven E.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aThought-Contents
_h[electronic resource] :
_bOn the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution /
_cby Steven E. Boër.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2007.
300 _aXVIII, 380 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aPhilosophical Studies Series ;
_v104
505 0 _aPreliminaries -- Terms of the Art -- Adequacy Conditions and Failed Theories -- Ontology -- Logical Forms and Mental Representations: The Lesson Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment -- Thought-Contents, Senses, and the Belief Relation: the Proto-Theory -- Thought-Contents, Senses, and the Belief Relation: the Full Theory -- Semantics -- Belief Reports and Compositional Semantics -- Meeting the Semantical Adequacy Conditions -- Objections and Replies -- Rear-Guard Action -- The Case for Object-Dependent Thoughts -- A Critique of Rival Accounts of Singular Thoughts.
520 _aThis book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to a thought-content T just in case one (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a certain sentence S of one’s language of thought that satisfies what T encodes, which in turn requires that S’s non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantical relations to items specified by T. Since these items may include other senses as well as ordinary objects, beliefs of arbitrary complexity are automatically accommodated. Within the framework of the formal ontology, a context-dependent compositional semantics is then provided for a fragment of regimented English capable of formulating ascriptions of belief—a semantics that treats substitutional opacity as a genuine semantic datum. Finally, the resulting picture of belief and its attribution is defended by showing how it solves standard puzzles, avoids objections to rival accounts, and satisfies certain adequacy conditions not fulfilled by traditional theories. Along the way, clarification and defense is offered for the ingredient conception of object-dependent senses, and it is shown how adoption of the language of thought hypothesis permits Bertrand Russell’s obscure doctrine of logical forms to be understood in a way that not only vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief but also reveals the connection between these logical forms and thought-contents.
650 0 _aPhilosophy.
650 0 _aOntology.
650 0 _aLanguage and languages
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aSemantics.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aOntology.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Language.
650 2 4 _aSemantics.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy, general.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781402050848
830 0 _aPhilosophical Studies Series ;
_v104
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5085-2
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
950 _aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648)
999 _c503024
_d503024