000 | 02889nam a22005055i 4500 | ||
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001 | 978-1-4020-3982-9 | ||
003 | DE-He213 | ||
005 | 20161121230626.0 | ||
007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
008 | 100301s2006 ne | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
020 |
_a9781402039829 _9978-1-4020-3982-9 |
||
024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/1-4020-3982-4 _2doi |
|
050 | 4 | _aBD95-131 | |
072 | 7 |
_aHPJ _2bicssc |
|
072 | 7 |
_aPHI013000 _2bisacsh |
|
082 | 0 | 4 |
_a110 _223 |
100 | 1 |
_aSneddon, Andrew. _eauthor. |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aAction and Responsibility _h[electronic resource] / _cby Andrew Sneddon. |
264 | 1 |
_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2006. |
|
300 |
_aX, 200 p. _bonline resource. |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
||
490 | 1 |
_aLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, _x1387-6678 ; _v18 |
|
505 | 0 | _aTwo Questions -- Ascriptivism Resurrected: The Case for Ascriptivism -- Ascriptivism Defended: The Case Against Ascriptivism -- Responsibility and Causation I: Legal Responsibility -- Responsibility and Causation II: Moral Responsibility -- Foundationalism and the Production Question -- Foundationalism and the Status Question: Strong Productionism -- Nouveau Volitionism -- Weak Productionism -- Concluding Reflections on Ascriptivism and Action. | |
520 | _aWhat makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions. | ||
650 | 0 | _aPhilosophy. | |
650 | 0 | _aEthics. | |
650 | 0 | _aMetaphysics. | |
650 | 0 | _aPhilosophy of mind. | |
650 | 0 | _aPhilosophy and social sciences. | |
650 | 1 | 4 | _aPhilosophy. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aMetaphysics. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aEthics. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aPhilosophy of Mind. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences. |
710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
773 | 0 | _tSpringer eBooks | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9781402039966 |
830 | 0 |
_aLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, _x1387-6678 ; _v18 |
|
856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3982-4 |
912 | _aZDB-2-SHU | ||
950 | _aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648) | ||
999 |
_c501540 _d501540 |