000 | 02698nam a22004215i 4500 | ||
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001 | 978-1-4020-2582-2 | ||
003 | DE-He213 | ||
005 | 20161121230620.0 | ||
007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
008 | 100301s2005 ne | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
020 |
_a9781402025822 _9978-1-4020-2582-2 |
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024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/1-4020-2582-3 _2doi |
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050 | 4 | _aBD95-131 | |
072 | 7 |
_aHPJ _2bicssc |
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072 | 7 |
_aPHI013000 _2bisacsh |
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082 | 0 | 4 |
_a110 _223 |
100 | 1 |
_aBobro, Marc Elliott. _eauthor. |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aSelf and Substance in Leibniz _h[electronic resource] / _cby Marc Elliott Bobro. |
264 | 1 |
_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2005. |
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300 |
_aVIII, 144 p. _bonline resource. |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
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505 | 0 | _aAm I Essentially a Person? -- What Makes Me a Person? -- What Makes Me The Same Person? -- Could Thinking Machines Be Moral Agents? -- Why Bodies? -- What Makes My Survival Meaningful?. | |
520 | _aThere is a close connection in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s mind between the notions of self and substance. R. W. Meyer, in his classic 1948 text, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution, writes that “the monad … is nothing but a 1 représentation (in both senses of the French word) of Leibniz’s personality in metaphysical symbols; and there was, under contemporary circumstances, no need 2 to ‘introduce’ this concept apart from ‘propounding’ it. ” It is not clear what Meyer means here except that from the consideration of his own self, in some way Leibniz comes to his concept of simple substance, or monad. Herbert Carr, in an even earlier work, notes that Leibniz held that “the only real unities in nature are formal, not material. … [and] [f]or a long time Leibniz was content to call the formal unities or substantial forms he was speaking about, souls. This had the advantage that it referred at once to the fact of experience which supplies the very 3 type of a substantial form, the self or ego. ” Finally, Nicholas Rescher, in his usual forthright manner, states that “[i]n all of Leibniz’s expositions of his philosophy, 4 the human person is the paradigm of a substance. | ||
650 | 0 | _aPhilosophy. | |
650 | 0 | _aMetaphysics. | |
650 | 1 | 4 | _aPhilosophy. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aMetaphysics. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aHistory of Philosophy. |
710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
773 | 0 | _tSpringer eBooks | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9781402020247 |
856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-2582-3 |
912 | _aZDB-2-SHU | ||
950 | _aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648) | ||
999 |
_c501404 _d501404 |