PKK Library

Your cart is empty.

Welcome to P K Kelkar Library, Online Public Access Catalogue (OPAC)

Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Apprehension and Argument : Ancient Theories of Starting Points for Knowledge /

By: Tuominen, Miira [author.].
Contributor(s): SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind: 3Publisher: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2007.Description: XIV, 328 p. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781402050435.Subject(s): Philosophy | Philosophy, Ancient | Epistemology | Philosophy of mind | Philosophy and science | Cultural studies | Philosophy | Classical Philosophy | Cultural Studies | History of Philosophy | Epistemology | Philosophy of Mind | Philosophy of ScienceDDC classification: 180 Online resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
From the contents Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations and a Note on the Texts -- Introduction -- Part I: Platonic-Aristotelian Tradition -- 1. Premises of Argumentation. 2. Intellectual Apprehension -- Part II: Alternative Approaches. 3. Hellenistic Philosophy -- Conclusion. Bibliography. Index of Contents. Index of Names -- Index of Cited Texts.
In: Springer eBooksSummary: If we know something, do we always know it through something else? Does this mean that the chain of knowledge should continue infinitely? Or, rather, should we abandon this approach and ask how we acquire knowledge? Irrespective of the fact that very basic questions concerning human knowledge have been formulated in various ways in different historical and philosophical contexts, philosophers have been surprisingly unanimous concerning the point that structures of knowledge should not be infinite. In order for there to be knowledge, there must be at least some primary elements which may be called ‘starting points’. This book offers the first synoptic study of how the primary elements in knowledge structures were analysed in antiquity from Plato to late ancient commentaries, the main emphasis being on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. It argues that, in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, the question of starting points was treated from two distinct points of view: from the first perspective, as a question of how we acquire basic knowledge; and from the second perspective, as a question of the premises we may immediately accept in the line of argumentation. It was assumed that we acquire some general truths rather naturally and that these function as starting points for inquiry. In the Hellenistic period, an alternative approach was endorsed: the very possibility of knowledge became a central issue when sceptics began demanding that true claims should always be distinguishable from false ones.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
E books E books PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur
Available EBK3308
Total holds: 0

From the contents Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations and a Note on the Texts -- Introduction -- Part I: Platonic-Aristotelian Tradition -- 1. Premises of Argumentation. 2. Intellectual Apprehension -- Part II: Alternative Approaches. 3. Hellenistic Philosophy -- Conclusion. Bibliography. Index of Contents. Index of Names -- Index of Cited Texts.

If we know something, do we always know it through something else? Does this mean that the chain of knowledge should continue infinitely? Or, rather, should we abandon this approach and ask how we acquire knowledge? Irrespective of the fact that very basic questions concerning human knowledge have been formulated in various ways in different historical and philosophical contexts, philosophers have been surprisingly unanimous concerning the point that structures of knowledge should not be infinite. In order for there to be knowledge, there must be at least some primary elements which may be called ‘starting points’. This book offers the first synoptic study of how the primary elements in knowledge structures were analysed in antiquity from Plato to late ancient commentaries, the main emphasis being on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. It argues that, in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, the question of starting points was treated from two distinct points of view: from the first perspective, as a question of how we acquire basic knowledge; and from the second perspective, as a question of the premises we may immediately accept in the line of argumentation. It was assumed that we acquire some general truths rather naturally and that these function as starting points for inquiry. In the Hellenistic period, an alternative approach was endorsed: the very possibility of knowledge became a central issue when sceptics began demanding that true claims should always be distinguishable from false ones.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Powered by Koha