Welcome to P K Kelkar Library, Online Public Access Catalogue (OPAC)

Normal view MARC view ISBD view

The Moral Wager : Evolution and Contract /

By: Murray, Malcolm [author.].
Contributor(s): SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Philosophical Studies Series: 108Publisher: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2007.Description: IX, 247 p. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781402058554.Subject(s): Philosophy | Ethics | Evolutionary biology | Game theory | Philosophy | Ethics | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | Evolutionary Biology | Philosophy, generalDDC classification: 170 Online resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
Irrealism -- Against Moral Categoricity -- Self-Interest -- Rationality’s Failure -- Evolutionary Fit -- Consent Theory -- Concerned Parties -- Suffering and Indifference.
In: Springer eBooksSummary: This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
E books E books PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur
Available EBK3369
Total holds: 0

Irrealism -- Against Moral Categoricity -- Self-Interest -- Rationality’s Failure -- Evolutionary Fit -- Consent Theory -- Concerned Parties -- Suffering and Indifference.

This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Powered by Koha