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Part of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 131-148).

1. Introduction -- 2. Basic notation -- 2.1 Social choice -- 2.2 Game theory -- 2.3 Game forms are voting rules --

Part I. The quest for truthful voting -- 3. Strategyproofness and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- 3.1 Voting manipulations -- 3.2 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- 3.3 Frequency of manipulation -- 3.4 Group manipulations -- 3.4.1 Safe manipulations -- 3.5 Irresolute social choice correspondences -- 3.6 Exercises -- 4. Regaining truthfulness in voting -- 4.1 Domain restriction -- 4.1.1 Single-peaked preferences on a line -- 4.1.2 Other single-peak domains -- 4.1.3 Dichotomous preferences -- 4.2 Complexity barriers -- 4.2.1 Few candidates and coalitional manipulations -- 4.3 Randomized voting rules -- 4.3.1 Gibbard's characterization -- 4.3.2 Stronger impossibility results -- 4.3.3 Output approximation -- 4.4 Almost-strategyproof rules -- 4.4.1 Approximation with almost-strategyproof rules -- 4.4.2 Differential privacy -- 4.5 Exercises -- 5. Voting and mechanism design -- 5.1 Payments -- 5.1.1 The VCG mechanism -- 5.2 Range voting -- 5.2.1 Approximation by randomized voting rules -- 5.3 Facility location -- 5.3.1 Location in a general metric space -- 5.3.2 Location on a line -- 5.3.3 Location on a circle -- 5.3.4 Other variations -- 5.4 Judgment aggregation -- 5.4.1 Formal framework -- 5.4.2 Incentives and manipulation -- 5.5 Exercises --

Part II. Voting equilibrium models -- 6. Simultaneous voting games -- 6.1 Desiderata for voting models -- 6.2 Implementation -- 6.2.1 Nash implementation -- 6.2.2 Strong implementation -- 6.2.3 Implementation in undominated strategies -- 6.2.4 Other notions of implementation -- 6.3 Fallback strategies -- 6.3.1 Truth bias/partial honesty -- 6.3.2 Laziness and the paradox of voting -- 6.4 The "calculus of voting" -- 6.4.1 The expected value of voting -- 6.4.2 Equilibrium stability -- 6.4.3 Social networks -- 6.4.4 Quantal response equilibrium -- 6.5 Other equilibrium models -- 6.5.1 Minimax regret -- 6.5.2 Robust equilibrium -- 6.5.3 Iterated removal of dominated strategies -- 6.6 Exercises -- 7. Iterative and sequential voting -- 7.1 Convergence and acyclicity -- 7.2 Examples -- 7.2.1 Plurality -- 7.2.2 Veto -- 7.2.3 Borda -- 7.3 Convergence results -- 7.3.1 Convergence in plurality -- 7.3.2 Other voting rules -- 7.3.3 Simultaneous moves -- 7.4 Welfare implications -- 7.5 Sequential voting -- 7.5.1 Subgame perfect equilibrium -- 7.5.2 Iterated majority voting -- 7.6 Exercises -- 8. Voting heuristics -- 8.1 Heuristic voting models -- 8.1.1 Ad hoc heuristics -- 8.1.2 Local dominance -- 8.1.3 Other dominance-based heuristics -- 8.2 Equilibrium and convergence -- 8.2.1 Sampling equilibrium -- 8.3 Implications of heuristic voting -- 8.4 exercises -- 9. Summary: toward a complete theory of strategic voting -- 9.1 Empirical and experimental findings -- 9.2 Conclusion --

Bibliography -- Author's biography.

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Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science. The book has two parts. The first part asks "are there voting rules that are truthful?" in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design such as locating a facility that serves multiple users. In the second part, we ask "what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically?" rather than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social welfare. We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in future development of game theoretic voting models.

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Title from PDF title page (viewed on June 23, 2018).