Financial crisis, corporate governance, and bank capital
By: Bhagat, Sanjai.
Publisher: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2017Description: xv, 242p.ISBN: 9781107170643.Subject(s): Banks and banking -- United States | Corporate governance -- United StatesDDC classification: 331.2 | B469f Summary: In the aftermath of the 2007–8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law.| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Books
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PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur | General Stacks | 331.2 B469f (Browse shelf) | Available | A184198 |
Browsing PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur Shelves , Collection code: General Stacks Close shelf browser
| 331.1954 V191 LABOUR WELFARE IN INDIA | 331.1973 M115L LABOR RALATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING | 331.2 B469e ECONOMICS OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL WELFARE | 331.2 B469f Financial crisis, corporate governance, and bank capital | 331.2 Si6m Movement of industrial wages in India | 331.20470954 B223G GLOBALISATION, INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND LABOUR STANDARDS | 331.21 D746t THE THEORY OF WAGES |
In the aftermath of the 2007–8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law.
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