Preferences in Negotiations : The Attachment Effect /
By: Gimpel, Henner [author.].
Contributor(s): SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: BookSeries: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: 595Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007.Description: XIV, 268 p. 34 illus. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783540723387.Subject(s): Life sciences | Operations research | Decision making | Behavioral sciences | Applied mathematics | Engineering mathematics | Game theory | Microeconomics | Psychology | Life Sciences | Behavioral Sciences | Microeconomics | Applications of Mathematics | Operation Research/Decision Theory | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | Psychology, generalDDC classification: 591.5 Online resources: Click here to access onlineItem type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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E books | PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur | Available | EBK4356 |
Theories on Preferences -- Preferences in Negotiations -- Internet Experiment -- Laboratory Experiment -- Conclusions and Future Work.
Negotiations are ubiquitous in business, politics, and private life. In many cases their outcome is of great importance. Yet, negotiators frequently act irrationally and fail to reach mutually beneficial agreements. Cognitive biases like overconfidence, egocentrism, and the mythical fixed pie illusion oftentimes foreclose profitable results. A further cognitive bias is the attachment effect: Parties are influenced by their subjective expectations formed on account of the exchange of offers, they form reference points, and loss aversion potentially leads to a change of preferences when expectations change. This book presents a motivation, formalization, and substantiation of the attachment effect. Thereby, preferences and behavior are approached from a microeconomic and a psychological perspective. Two experiments show clear evidence for a systematic bias. The results can be used for prescriptive advice to negotiators: either for debiasing or to systematically affect the counterparty.
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