The Metaphysics of Science-1 : An Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories /
By: Dilworth, Craig [author.].
Contributor(s): SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type:
BookSeries: Boston Studies in The Philosophy of Science: 173Publisher: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2006.Description: XVI, 333 p. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781402038389.Subject(s): Philosophy | Epistemology | Metaphysics | Philosophy and science | Biology -- Philosophy | Philosophy and social sciences | Philosophy | Philosophy of Science | Philosophy of the Social Sciences | Philosophy of Biology | Metaphysics | EpistemologyDDC classification: 501 Online resources: Click here to access online | Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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E books
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PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur | Available | EBK1808 |
Empiricism Vs. Realism – The Perennial Debate In The Philosophy Of Science -- Fundamental And Refined Principles: The Core Of Modern Science -- Empirical Laws: The Supervention Of Experience -- Scientific Theories: Closing The Circle -- The Principle-Theory-Law Model Of Scientific Explanation -- The Social Sciences: A Consideration Of Economics -- Natural Kinds -- Probability And Confirmation -- Empiricism Vs. Realism Revisited -- Modern Science And The Future.
The roots of this work lie in my earlier book, Scientific Progress, which first appeared in 1981. One of its topics, the distinction - tween scientific laws and theories, is there treated with reference to the same distinction as drawn by N. R. Campbell in his Physics: The Elements. Shortly after completing Scientific Progress, I read Rom Harré’s The Principles of Scientific Thinking, in which the concept of theory is even more clearly delineated than in Campbell, being directly connected to the notion of a model – as it was in my book. In subsequent considerations regarding science, Harré’s work thus - came my main source of inspiration with regard to theories, while Campbell’s remained my main source with respect to empirical laws. Around the same time I also read William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In this work, Whewell depicts principles as playing a central role in the formation of science, and conceives of them in much the same way as Kant conceives of fundamental synthetic a priori judgements. The idea that science should have principles as a basic element immediately made sense to me, and from that time I have thought of science in terms of laws, theories and principles.
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